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Abstract
In this paper we investigate whether there is empirical evidence
to support the idea that countries set their taxes interdependently.
To test this idea we estimate countries’ reaction functions using a
panel of data across countries, years and tax classes. We find that
they are interdependent, and in a way that is consistent with the tax
competition literature. Taxes on mobile factors react more than those
on less mobile factors. This reaction is larger between countries where
we think these factors are more mobile.
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1 Introduction
The possibility that tax setting behaviour is interdependent between coun-
tries is the cornerstone of recent policy debate focussing on tax competition.
Casual observation supports the hypothesis that countries compete. Statu-
tory tax rates have fallen in most industrialised countries over the past few
decades (see Figure 1). In OECD countries average tax rates on retained in-
come fell form 51.1% in 1985 to 38.1% in 1999. This paper considers whether
there is any stronger empirical evidence to suggest a process of tax competi-
tion, and if so what form it takes.
A large body of theoretical literature has build up around the presence of
tax setting externalities. While there is a growing empirical literature at the
level of local governments or between local and national government within
a country,1 there is much less empirical validation of the importance of such
externalities in tax setting between diﬀerent countries. The aim of this paper
is to explore the empirical evidence by estimating tax reaction functions for
a the main types of taxes using data on OECD countries over the period
1980-2003.
The theoretical literature on tax competition between countries has gen-
erated many alternative propositions.2 A central result of the theoretical
literature is that in small, open economies there should be no source-based
1See Brueckner (2001) for a survey.
2See Devereux (1996) for a survey of these predictions and Wilson (1999) for a survey
of the theoretical literature.
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capital taxation, only residence-based. However, most countries operate a
combination of the two, although in practice they tend to be more source
than residence-based, as the enforcement of residence -based corporate in-
ocm system is diﬃcult, largely because of problems in gathering information
about the activities of companies located in other jurisdictions. Thus many
theoretical models assume that countries can only use source-based taxes.
Where capital is assumed to be perfectly mobile, and if the country is a
price-taker in the world capital market, then the owners of capital will not
bear the incidence of a corporate income tax.3 An increase in capital taxes
will lead to an outflow of capital which will drive up the pre-tax rate of return
until the post-tax rate of return is again equal to that in other locations. This
means that the incidence of the tax is not on the owners of mobile capital.
Instead, as capital flows out of the country, the income of immobile factors
of production declines, implying that the burden of capital taxation falls on
these immobile factors. A dead-weight loss arises as a result of the lower level
of investment in capital, which would be avoided if the immobile factors were
taxed directly.
This logic has led many papers to conclude that capital taxes should be
zero,4 or that small countries should choose lower source based capital income
3See, inter alia, Gordon (1986), Razin and Sadka (1991) and Bucovetsky and Wilson
(1991). Other important references in this literature include Oates (1982) and Zodrow and
Mieszkowski (1986) who showed that competition between countries created an incentive
to hold tax rates on capital income down.
4See, inter alia, including Bucovetsky and Wilson (1991), Razin and Sadka (1991).
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tax rates than large countries5 and that any revenue that the government
required should be raised from a tax on immobile factors, such as labour.
Empirically it is clear that taxes levied on corporate income are not in fact
zero. This, and other, observations have led to numerous models explaining
why they might not be zero.
One obvious empirical explanation is that, while capital may be increas-
ingly mobile, it is not perfectly so. It could be that capital taxes are tending
towards zero, but have not reached it yet. This is possible, but one needs
to be clear about what is changing that makes capital more mobile. In our
empirical investigation below we look at this in two ways. First, we look
across several tax bases that we believe to have diﬀerential levels of mobility.
Secondly, we look at how joining the European Union has aﬀected the inter-
dependence in countries’ tax rates. An explicit aim of EU integration was to
encourage the free movement of capital across national boundaries.
The basic theory presented above assumes that capital is perfectly mo-
bile between countries. But if it is not mobile, or at least not perfectly so,
what does this imply for the ability of governments to tax it? Janeba (1994)
suggests that if capital is immobile then domestic firms should be subsidised.
One possibility is that there are both mobile and immobile forms of cap-
ital, that governments are limited to the broad instrument of a universal
corporate income tax and are prepared to accept the ineﬃcient dead weight
loss associated with taxing mobile capital, in order to collect revenue from
5See, inter alia, Bucovetsky (1991), Wilson (1991)
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the immobile form of capital. We would still expect that, where possible,
governments would seek to levy higher taxes on capital that was less mobile.
This form of immobility means that there are location specific economic
rents to be earned. Each government can, in principle, capture the economic
rent that is specific to their location. Taxes on natural resource, such as
petroleum, are a classic example of a tax of this form. One interpretation of
the variation we see in tax rates shown is that countries have diﬀerent levels
of location specific attributes, allowing them to collect tax on some forms of
corporate income.
This literature generally does not predict actual reactions functions, but
rather simply explains why there may be a downward pressure in taxes as
economic integration proceeds. Nevertheless, we can take two empirical pre-
dictions and look for support in the data. These are (1) taxes on mobile fac-
tors should have steeper reaction functions than less mobile factors, and (2)
reactions functions between countries where factors flow more freely should
be steeper than between countries where there are barriers to the free flow
of factors.
This paper focuses on direct empirical evidence for tax competition.
Before turning to that discussion it is worth noting that alternatively
we could look for indirect evidence. For example, if we found that firms’
location decision were very sensitive to changes in tax regimes, then this
would suggest that rational welfare-maximising governments would either
engage in tax competition, or set taxes co-operatively. There are several
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recent surveys of this sort of indirect evidence. Hines (1999) reviews this
literature and concludes that the allocation of real resources is highly sensitive
to tax policies. de Mooij, R.A. and S. Ederveen (2001) similarly conclude
that foreign capital is very sensitive to tax (using meta analysis). Devereux
and Griﬃth (2001) discuss these findings and the literature on which they
are based. They conclude that, while there is some evidence that taxes aﬀect
firms’ location and investment decisions, it isn’t clear how big is this aﬀect
and they note that the literature has provided little by way of insight into the
key questions for policy interest. Linking the (reduced form) estimates from
this literature to the (structural parameters in a) model of tax competition is
very diﬃcult, and has not been done satisfactorily. Thus we are left unable to
say very much from the empirical literature about important policy questions.
A number of papers have looked at competition between local govern-
ments (mainly US States). Brueckner (2001) provides an excellent survey
of this literature. These studies suggest support for all three forms of tax
competition. Case, Rosen and Hines (1993) find evidence of interdependence
between US States due to public expenditure spillovers while Fredriksson
and Millimet (2001) find evidence to suggest that there are spillovers due to
pollution abatement. Murdoch, Sandler and Sargent (1997) reach a similar
conclusion looking across European countries.
A number of papers also find evidence of yardstick competition - Besley
and Case (1995) for US States and Bivand and Szymanski (1997, 2000) and
Revelli (2001) for UK regions.
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The resource flows model is the one of most interest to us here. Empirical
papers that consider such a model include: Brueckner and Saavedra (2001)
for property taxes in cities in the Boston metropolitan area, Brett and Pinske
(1997,2000) for local property taxes in Canada, Buettner (2001) for local
business tax in Germany and Hayashi and Boadway (2000) for provincial
corporate taxes in Canada.
Only very recently has empirical work turned to international tax com-
petition. Chennells and Griﬃth (1997) consider specific predictions from the
tax competition literature and looks at whether the empirical evidence sup-
ports them. They calculate eﬀective and implicit tax rates for ten countries
over the period 1979-1994. They then consider whether small countries have
lower taxes than larger countries, whether this depends on the degree of open-
ness, and whether capital importing countries set their tax rates at, or below,
a dominant capital exporter. Neither of these hypotheses are supported by
the data.
Devereux, Griﬃth and Klemm (2002) present evidence on the develop-
ment of taxes on the income from capital since the mid 1960s. They compare
alternative measures and show that eﬀective tax rates on mobile capital have
declined but that revenue has remained static or even increased. These two
trends may be reconciled by an increase in corporate income; in turn this
may be due at least partly to a reclassification of activities as corporate, or
possibly just a reclassification of income as corporate profit.
Devereux, Lockwood and Redoano (2001) use an updated version of the
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data in Chennells and Griﬃth and estimate countries’ reaction functions.
The strength of this paper is that the authors pay careful attention to mea-
suring forward-looking eﬀective tax rates. The weakness is that, in order to
do this, they limit themselves to ten countries over a relatively short time
period, and can only look at taxes on specific types of corporate investment.
They find evidence to suggest that there is interdependence in the statutory
and average tax rates, but not in marginal tax rates. They interpret this as
evidence in favour of tax competition. The authors are not able to provide
any supporting evidence to distinguish between the various models (resource
flows, yardstick, spillovers or other common factors).
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows: ...
2 Empirical specification
One possible approach to testing for intedependent tax setting would be to
consider a specific model of tax competition and empirically test the pre-
dictions from that model. This could be either against a null of no inter-
dependence in tax setting, or against some alternative model of tax setting
behaviour. A rejection of the model tested would thus not be a rejection of
interdependence intax setting per se.
In this paper we do not follow this approach. Instead we attempt to esti-
mate countries’ reaction functions directly, imposing only a basic structure,
which is necessary to allow us to estimate these functions with the limited
available data. The results obtained will help us answer both the question
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of wether there is any interdependence and whether or not this consistent
with the broad predictions from the theoretical literature described in the
Introduction.
We develop a simple empirical specification based on an underlying the-
ory which views governments as setting taxes to achieve well defined ends.
Suppose that a government in jurisdiction s at time tmust raise taxes to meet
an expenditure requirement G. It has a variety of tax instruments denoted
by a vector (t1st, ..., tMst) to achieve its ends. The possibility of mobility of
tax bases implies that consumers care about the taxes set on the goods in
other jurisdictions. We denote the vector of all other relevant taxes by Tst.
The government’s objective can be modeled in terms of a set of weights on N
groups of heterogeneous consumers with payoﬀ functions vjst (t, T )+φjst (G)
(j = 1, ..., N). The weights are denoted (ω1st, ..., ωNst). The demand for good
i by group j is Xijst (t, T ) . Then government revenue is
Rst (t, T ) =
X
j
X
i
tiXijst (t, T ) . (1)
The government’s objective is
Wst (t, T, ωst) =
X
j
ωjstvjst (t, T ) . (2)
This is a standard maximization problem holding T as fixed. The first order
condition can be written as
Xkst −X∗kst = λst
X
i
tist
∂Xist
∂tkst
k = 1, ..., N (3)
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where X∗ist =
P
j
³
ωjst
λst
´
Xjist and for optimal public spending
λst =
X
j
ωjstφ0jst (Gst) . (4)
To generate an empirical specification, we begin by taking λ as given. In
general, we can solve (3) to generate equations of the form:
t∗ist = g (λst, ωst, Tst) .
Thus, the exogenous variables are the shadow price of public funds, the vector
of “welfare weights” and the taxes set in the other competing jurisdictions.
Under this general specification, it is quite possible for taxes on all goods
to aﬀect tax setting on good i. This is empirically demanding. Under the
simplifying assumption that Xi depends only on (tist, Tist), this becomes
t∗ist = g (λst, ωst, Tist)
where Tist is the tax rate on good i in the other jurisdiction. This will be
the main specification that we study empirically. In fact, we work with the
advalorem tax rate in jurisdiction s at time t denoted τ ist.
It is clear that we do not observe λst directly in the data. However, as we
noted above, this will depend on the level of public spending in the economy
under the hypothesis that preferences for taxes and spending are separable.6
Thus, we write
λst = h (G∗ (ωst, Tst) , ω, Tst) .
6Besley and Jewitt (1991) discuss in more detail the conditions under which tax setting
and public spending is optimally separable.
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To proxy for the vector ωst we will use characteristics of the government in
power. Putting this together, we propose the following estimation method.
Let τ ist be the tax on category i in country s at time t then
τ ∗ist = µiRst + Z 0stγ + βiTist + ηis + ζt + εist (5)
where Rst is the ratio of total tax revenue to GDP, Zst is a vector of other
controls ηis captures country-good fixed eﬀects, ζt captures common macro
trends and εist is an idiosyncratic shock. Note that we have allowed the
coeﬃcients on total tax revenue (µ) and the slope of the reaction function
(β) to vary by tax class. The vector of coeﬃcients on the other control
variables (γ) is, however, restricted to be constant across tax classes. We
discuss this identifying assumption in the next section. To implement this
empirically, we model Tist as the weighted average value of other countries’
tax rates, specifically:
Tist =
P
k 6=swstτkitP
k 6=swst
. (6)
where w is the weight, which is GDP in US Dollars, converted using a pur-
chasing power parity exchange rate.
3 Data and measurement
The most readily available measures of tax rates are ratios based on macro—
economic data such as tax revenues as a share of GDP or an approximation
of the tax base. While such measures have the advantage of being available
for a large number of countries, taxes and years, there are great doubts as
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to whether the can be useful when analysing the tax-setting behaviour of
countries.
Theoretically, this is because such measures are backward looking, and
include the eﬀects of past investment decisions, unrelieved losses etc. In any
given year, the measure will therefore depend on the history of investment
in a given country, rather than on the current investment climate or current
policy.
Devereux and Klemm (2004) show that this concern is not purely theoret-
ical, but that such measures will in practice lead to very diﬀerent description
of tax rates than measures based on the tax laws. To some extent one can
try to control for the factors that aﬀect such measures, but this is unlikely
to be completely satisfactory.
To make this point more obvious, consider Figure 1, which shows the
UK’s statutory tax rate against two measures based on macrodata. It can be
noted that the macro-data measures are both volatile, and exhibit diﬀerent
trends from the statutory tax sytem. There are reasons to believe that this is
not just due to the economic cycle and other other unrelated events, but that
this creates a direct bias of the measure. To give just one example, consider
that a tax cut leads to an inflow of profits into a country. The tax ratios will
rise and indicate a higher tax burden, even though the opposite is true.
Concerning corporate taxes, we therfore focus on measures based on the
tax law, mainly on the stautory tax rate. A case could be made for using
eﬀective tax rates as suggested by Devereux and Griﬃth (2003). This is
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because location decisions will not only depend on the statutory tax rate, but
also on other tax provisions, such as the definition of the tax base, which is
to a large extent determined by the generosity of investment allowances. We
have experimented with such tax rates and generally obtain similar results.
Our main measures will however be statutory tax rates, because they are
the main component determining the value of eﬀective average tax rates,
provided the profitability is suﬃciently large. Eﬀective marginal tax rates
can be very diﬀerent, but they depend so strongly on assumptions that it
is doubtful how valid the comparison across countries and time periods may
be. Furthermore, to the extent that countries may compete for paper profits
rather than real activity (e.g. as in Haufler and Schjelderup, 2000), the
statutory tax rate is the more relevant measure. We use data collected at
the IFS for previous projects. They are available from the IFS website.
When considering labour taxes, the choice is less obvious. We could
for similar reasons as above consider the maximum statutory tax rates. In
the case of labour taxes though, it is questionable how relevant this rate
is. In many countries and time periods, the top tax bracket aﬀected only a
minority of incomes and may therefore have had direct eﬀects on a small part
of the population only (which in turn may have had acces to tax avoidance).
When considering a tax rate that is relevant for economic activity, there is
then a case for considering the average tax rate, defined as taxes paid by an
average worker as a share of gross income. Note that we include any taxes on
labour income, be they labelled income taxes, payroll taxes or social security
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contributions. These data are from the OECD’s Taxing Wages data base.
For a few of the earlier years, we needed to interpolate the data, as the data
base was biannual until 19xx.
While, as argued above, the top tax rate may be confusing when consid-
ering the economic incentives faced by most individuals in the economy, it is
still interesting in its own right. First, as the best-paid individuals are likely
to have important economic influence and second, because of the signal sent
out to worldwide investors. We therefore also consider this measure at times.
Unfortunately though, data limitations make it impossible to include payroll
and social security taxes in that case. In the case of social security contri-
butions that may not be a major drawback, as these are capped in many
countries so that the top marginal rate is in fact 0 per cent. These date
were obtained from the World Tax Database, maintained at the University
of Michigan. We have checked the data manually, and removed some obvious
mistakes.
When calculating leave-out averages, we take care to calcualte them on
a balanced panel of countries, so that changes in the average, reflect tax
reforms rather than changes in the availability of data. We nevertheless run
the regressions on all countries, including those for which data are not present
in all years. Results on a perferctly balanced panel were similare though.
We also use some general economic and political variables as controls.
They are from the follwoing data sets...
Table 1 provides some descriptive statistics of all the data used.
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4 Identification
The aim of this paper is to find out whether, and to what extent, tax set-
ting behaviour in one country reacts to other countries’ tax systems. But
estimating a reaction function such as (5) does not in itself present a test of
competitive behaviour, as there may be observational equivalence between
diﬀerent processes. It could be the case, for example, that countries reduce
tax rates at similar points in time because of a cooperative tax setting process,
or a common intellectual trend rather than because of a direct reaction to
other countries’ behaviour.
Manski (1993) addressed the question of identification such a context.
In particular he asks whether endogeneous social eﬀects can be identified
from other (exogenous) social eﬀects. Manski identifies three eﬀects which
can lead the observation that members of a group, such as the tax-setting
jurisdicitons in our case, behave similarly. These are:
1. Endogenous eﬀects: The behaviour of an individual varies with the
group behaviour;
2. Exogenous eﬀects: The behaviour of an individual varies with some
exogenous characteristics of the group;
3. Correlated eﬀects: The behaviour of an individual varies with some
individual characteristic which are similar across members of the group.
Another issue is the inclusion of year dummies and which relationship is
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estimated.In an appendix we show that β is only identified if we constrain
the time dummies in equation (5) to be equal across tax classes. In practice
this also means that it is important that we constrain γ (the parameter on
exogenous observable characteristics) to be constant across tax classes, since
much of the variation in the X variables is capturing time series eﬀects.
5 Estimation and results
Table 2 give some results of diﬀerent approaches to estimating equation ().
In all specification we condition on year and country-class dummies. This
means that we are allowing for a diﬀerent mean level of each type of tax in
each country and for common movements in tax rates, so we are identifying
the reaction from the relative deviations across countries. Our aim is to see
whether there is empirical support for the prediction that reaction functions
are steeper on more mobile factors.
All regressions allow for heteroskedasticity and serial correlation within
country-classses. [Note: without allowing for serial correlation, results are
even nicer]
In regresssion (1) we just regress tax rates on the leave-out averages,
including all dummies mentioned, but no further variables. We find that
the coeﬃcient on corporate income tax leave-out average is positive and
significant, but that the one for labour income taxes is insignificant. In
regression (2) we add the government’s revenue requirement, measures as the
share of government consumption in GDP. We allow the coeﬃcient to vary
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across tax classes. While it is insignificant for both tax classes at conventional
levels, it is closer to significance for labour income taxes.
These first regressions are biased, because the leave-out average is nec-
essarily endogenous, if there is indeed fiscal interdependence. We deal with
this in two ways. First in regression (3) we exclude the G3 countries from the
regression. This makes the leave-out average more exogenous, although not
perfectly so, as the G3 countries will have been the main factors determin-
ing its value, because of the weighting by GDP. Clearly this is not a perfect
solution. The results are similare to the previous regresssion.
Then we consider estimation using instrumental variables. Here we first
use a simplistic approach of assuming that lagged values of tax rates are
good instruments of current ones. The results on tax rates are again very
similar, although now the coeﬃcient on the revenue requirement has become
significant for labour taxes. In regresssion (5) then we consider political
variables as instruments for tax rates. Our methodology is to first obtain
predicted values of tax rates based on the instruments and then to calculate
the leave-out avareages of these. Using this approach we again obtain similar
results for the tax rates, although coeﬃcients on the reveuneu requirements
are now insignificant again.
More results, using top PIT rate. [finding is that top PIT rate also seems
to be interpdependent. Hence all of this may well be yardstick competition]
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6 Summary and conclusions
In this paper we have investigated whether there is empirical evidence to
support the idea that countries set their taxes interdependently. We find
that they do, and that they do so in a way that is consistent with the tax
competition literature. Taxes on mobile factors react more than taxes on less
mobile factors. However, we cannot rule out alternative explanations such
as yardstick competition.
7 Appendix: Identification
The following chart shows a plot of the 21 countries’ tax rates agains the
leave-out means for labour taxes. The downward sloping lines characterise
the relationship between the tax rate and the leave-out average within a given
year. The more interesting realationship for our purposes is the one for each
country over time. Depending on the tax rate this may downward or upward
sloping.
To see the identification problem first consider our model for only one
individual tax class, τ st with no other control variables
τ st = βτ−st + ηs + ζt + εst (7)
where
τ−st =
1
N − 1
X
j 6=s
τ jt =
N
N − 1τ t −
1
N − 1τ st.
Our main coeﬃcient of interest is β which is not identified in this model. To
see this rewrite (5) as¡
τ st − τ s − τ t + τ
¢
= β
¡
τ−st − τ−s − τ−t + τ−
¢
+ εst (8)
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where
τ s =
1
T
TX
t=1
τ st
τ t =
1
N
NX
s=1
τ st
τ = 1
NT
TX
t=1
NX
s=1
τ st
τ−s =
1
T
TX
t=1
τ−st =
N
N − 1τ −
1
N − 1τ s
τ−t =
1
N
NX
s=1
τ−st = τ t
τ− =
1
NT
TX
t=1
NX
s=1
τ−st = τ
substitute in to (??) gives¡
τ st − τ s − τ t − τ
¢
= β
µ
− 1
N − 1
¶¡
τ st − τ s − τ t + τ
¢
+ εst. (9)
Hence, the OLS estimator will be:
bβ = −1N−1P¡τ st − τ s − τ t + τ¢2
( −1N−1)
2
P¡
τ st − τ s − τ t + τ
¢2 (10)
= −(N − 1)
Identification with more than one tax class
We add diﬀerent classes i = 1...M , with leave out mean taken only across
your own class (so cross class eﬀects ruled out)
τ sit = βτ−sit + ηsi + ζt + εsit (11)
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in deviation form
(τ sit − τ si − τ t + τ) = β (τ−sit − τ−si − τ−t + τ−) + εsit (12)
where
τ−si =
N
N − 1τ i −
1
N − 1τ si
τ−t = τ t
substitution gives
(τ sit − τ st − τ i + τ) = β
µ
−1
N + 1
τ sit +
1
N + 1
τ si +
N
N + 1
τ it −
N
N + 1
τ i − τ t + τ
¶
+εsit
(13)
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